I. INTRODUCTION In Smith v. Phillips,' the United States Supreme Court held that a juror who seeks employment with the prosecutor's office during the course of a criminal defendant's trial does not necessarily compromise the defendant's sixth amendment right to an impartial jury. 2 The Court did not deny that an individual biased in favor of either party cannot be impartial or that a criminal jury including such an individual violates the guarantees of the sixth amendment. 3 The Court also recognized that the juror's actions in Phillips raised a serious question of whether he was biased in favor of the prosecution. 4 Nevertheless, the Court held that a post-trial evidentiary hearing could adequately determine whether the juror was prejudiced based largely upon the juror's own testimony. 5 Because the juror in Phillips did not admit to bias at the post-trial hearing, and because the defendant could offer no independent evidence of "actual" bias, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's sixth amendment challenge to his conviction. 6 By deciding that the juror's disclaimers sufficiently established his impartiality, the Court severely undermined Phillips's sixth amendment right to an impartial jury. Under the circumstances in Phillips, the Supreme Court should have deemed the juror biased as a matter of law, rather than insisting upon proof of "actual" bias in a post-trial hearing.
After voir dire, on the same day that he was sworn in, John Smith met with Rudolph Fontaine, a criminal court officer. 15 Fontaine mentioned that there was an opening for a major felony investigator at the New York County District Attorney's office, the office preparing to prosecute Phillips. Smith expressed interest in the position. Accordingly, Fontaine asked employees of the District Attorney's office about the application procedure.' 6 About halfway through Phillips's trial, John Smith submitted his application to the District Attorney's office for the position of major felony investigator.' 7 Smith's application first reached the desk of Assistant District Attorney Conboy.' 8 On November 9, 1974, Conboy gave it to the Assistant District Attorney primarily responsible for reviewing applications, Joan Sudolnik. She in turn forwarded the application to John Lang, another assistant to the District Attorney.1 9 On November 13, Fontaine spoke to Assistant District Attorney Robert Holmes about Smith's application, and informed him that Smith was on the Phillips jury. 20 Holmes immediately informed Sudolnik that one of her job applicants was currently hearing the Phillips case. Sudolnik told her secretary and Lang not to contact Smith until after the trial. On November 14, Sudolnik met with the Assistant District Attorneys prosecuting Phillips, Jack Litman and Phillip LaPenta, to advise them of the Smith problem. Litman told Sudolnik that he did not want to see anything relating to Smith's application. 22 Litman and LaPenta hinted that, since the defense counsel was satisfied as to the impartiality of a juror with an interest in law enforcement, Smith's subsequent application to the office prosecuting Phillips would not effect the defense counsel's opinion of Smith's impartiality. 102 S. Ct. at 943-94 n.4. Justice Marshall pointed out, however, that since the defendant was a former police officer, Smith's general interest in law enforcement would not necessarily work to Phillips's disadvantage. He argued that a juror's general interest in law enforcement is far different from ajuror's fear that his future employment may rest upon his finding the defendant guilty. Id. at 952 & n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
15 632 F.2d at 1020. At any time after rendition of a verdict of guilty and before sentence, the court may, upon motion of the defendant, set aside or modify the verdict or any part thereof upon the following grounds:
(2) That during the trial there occurred, out of the presence of the court, improper conduct by a juror, or improper conduct by another person in relation to a juror, which may have affected a substantial right of the defendant and which was not known to the defendant prior to the rendition of the verdict. THE LOWER COURTS' DECISIONS At the conclusion of the post-trial hearing, the trial judge found that Phillips had not sustained his burden of proving that Smith had impaired his sixth amendment right to an impartial jury. 3 1 Judge Birns based his finding in part on Smith's testimony that "I swore on oath to listen to the evidence and to render a verdict on that evidence. I did so."32 He also considered Smith's testimony that his desire for employment with the prosecutor's office did not affect his verdict: "That didn't enter my mind; I didn't think about it that way." 33 Smith's statements during voir dire also influenced the trial judge, who found that Smith's application reflected no more than the "predilection for law enforcement" made evident during Smith's pretrial questioning. 34 Although the judge characterized Smith's activities as "unprecedented imprudence on the part of a juror" and the prosecutors' failure to inform the court of Smith's application as "unique misjudgment," he found that Smith's application did not reflect a premature conclusion about the defendant's guilt. 35 The writ, holding that Smith was biased as a matter of law and that his presence on the Phillips jury therefore violated the defendant's right to an impartial jury. 39 The court recognized that "actual" bias exists only when there is evidence of a juror's prejudiced state of mind, 40 and it agreed with the state trial court that the evidence offered at the posttrial hearing was insufficient to show actual bias. 4 1 The court found, however, that when a juror applies for employment with the prosecuting attorney's office during the course of the defendant's trial, and that application is still pending during the period of the jury's deliberations, a court must conclusively presume that the juror is biased. 42 Such a conclusive presumption, the court pointed out, is not unreasonably burdensome since the facts in Phillips are not likely to recur often.
43
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not rule upon the district court's finding that Smith was impliedly biased because "the 'average' juror in his position 'would indeed be likely to favor the prosecutor's position.' "44 Instead, it affirmed the district court's decision on the ground that the prosecutors' misconduct deprived the defendant of a fair trial. 45 To condone the prosecutors' withholding of information which cast substantial doubt upon Smith's impartiality would prejudice the defendant and would "ill serve to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process." '46 The court relied on Brady v. Maiyland 4 7 and United States v. Agurs 48 to hold that a "prosecutor may not keep silent when he knows that a juror has applied to become his employee. The remainder of the majority's analysis followed tautologically from its assumption that an evidentiary hearing will adequately reveal any prejudice on the part of a juror. Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the resolution of prosecutorial misconduct claims turns on the fairness of the trial rather than the culpability of the prosecutor. 54 102 S. Ct. at 946 n.7. Defense counsel asserted that frequently the only evidence of a juror's state of mind is the juror's own assertions and that any denial of bias by a juror is inherently suspect. The Court responded that "'one who is trying as an honest man to live up to the sanctity of his oath is well qualified to say whether he has an unbiased mind in a certain matter. ' the proseuctors' failure to inform the court of Smith's application could not affect the fairness of the trial and could not, therefore, be the basis of a valid claim of prosecutorial misconduct.
7
Justice O'Connor concurred in the majority's opinion on the understanding that it did not preclude the use of the implied bias doctrine in appropriate circumstances. 58 While she agreed that a hearing would adequately reveal juror bias in most cases, including Phillips, she was concerned that a hearing may not show juror prejudice in "some extreme situations." 59 According to Justice O'Connor, the sixth amendment requires that a juror be deemed biased as a matter of law when, for example, a juror is an employee of the prosecutor, or when a juror is a relative of one of the participants in the trial, or when a juror was a witness or somehow involved in the crime. 6° She pointed out that no previous case precluded the use of the implied bias doctrine in appropriate situations. Justices Brennan and Stevens joined Justice Marshall in dissent. Justice Marshall argued that, "where the probability of bias is very high, and where the evidence adduced at a hearing can offer little assurance that prejudice does not exist, the juror should be deemed biased as a matter of law." ' 62 According to Justice Marshall, the Phillips case presented a situation calling for the application of the implied bias doctrine. The probability of Smith's bias in favor of the prosecution was 57 Id. at 948. The majority also noted that the trial court's finding that there was no evidence of actual bias is presumptively correct under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976) 
IMPLIED JUROR BIAS
enhanced not only by his application to the prosecutor's office during the trial, but also by his vigorous pursuit of that position. 6 3 Justice Marshall also argued that it was unlikely that a post-trial evidentiary hearing would reveal any prejudice on the part of Smith. He pointed out that any juror is "unlikely to admit that he had been unable to weigh the evidence fairly." '6 4 A juror will be especially reluctant to admit bias, Justice Marshall continued, when the juror knows that it was his own misconduct which created the doubt as to his impartiality.
65
Justice Marshall disagreed vehemently with the majority's assertion that the Court had "long held" that an evidentiary hearing is adequate to resolve all questions of juror bias. 6 6 He argued that the Court had previously employed the implied bias doctrine in those few situations in which the probability of bias was high and a hearing was not likely to reveal the bias.
67
The dissent also would have affirmed the lower court decisions on the alternate ground that the prosecutors' misconduct deprived Phillips of due process of law. Justice Marshall assumed arguendo that the majority correctly interpreted Brady and Agurs to require a showing of prejudice.6 According to the dissent, however, Phillips had suffered such prejudice when the prosecutors failed to disclose Smith's application before the jury retired to deliberate. Justice Marshall contended that if the prosecution had not withheld this information, the trial judge probably would have replaced Smith with an alternate juror. 69 The dis-63 Id. at 952 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 64 Id. at 953 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 65 Id. at 955 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent found unworkable Justice O'Connor's distinction between employees of the prosecutor, to whom the implied bias doctrine should apply, and those applying for a position with the prosecutor's office, to whom the doctrine should not apply. Justice Marshall argued that when an applicant's job prospects are at stake he may be even more "anxious to please" than he would be if he had already secured the position. Id. at 953 n.8. 
III. CRITIQUE OF SMITH V PHILLIPS

A. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "ACTUAL" AND "IMPLIED" BIAS
The majority in Phillips responded to the defendant's implied bias argument by holding that claims of implied bias are not cognizable under the sixth amendment guarantee to an impartial jury. The Supreme Court held that a defendant can establish a sixth amendment violation only by showing actual bias on the part of a juror.
7 1 A clear grasp of the distinction between "actual bias" and "implied bias" is thus essential both to an understanding of the radical step which the Supreme Court has taken in Philh'ps and to an evaluation of its statement that precedent dictated the result. 7 2 Although the concepts have been employed since the early 1800s, the labels "actual bias" and "implied bias" have arisen only within the last twenty years.
An inquiry into "actual bias" involves a determination of a juror's subjective state of mind, 73 which normally turns on the only possible evidence of a juror's psychological state-the juror's own admission or denial of bias. 74 The juror's testimony renders irrelevant indirect evidence of prejudice, such as a juror's relation to a party. 75 Furthermore, a finding of prejudice normally comes to an appellate court with a strong presumption of validity because it involves a credibility finding by the trial judge. 7 6 In contrast, inquiries into "implied bias" have involved an [T] here are occasions upon which further questioning is needed to permit the trial court to make its own judgment of a juror's impartiality based on objective facts, rather than relying exclusively on the jurors' subjective determinations of whether they were prejudiced.'). In Remmer I, the defendant claimed that a juror was biased against him because someone had approached the juror with a bribe for a favorable verdict. 84 The majority in Phillips made much of the fact that the Supreme Court remanded the case for a hearing into the juror's possible prejudice. In so doing, it implied that Remmer I demonstrates that the remedy for claims of juror prejudice is a hearing into actual bias. 85 The majority failed to mention, however, that the Court's subsequent resolution of this case in Remmer 1186 shows that Remmer I did not hold that a defendant can only prove a violation of his right to an impartial jury by proving actual juror bias. At the conclusion of the hearing on remand, the trial judge found that the juror was not biased, relying upon the juror's testimony to that effect. 87 If the defendant could have succeeded only proving actual juror bias, this finding would have ended the case.
88
Yet, in Remmer HI, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's right to an impartial jury had been violated, and it ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court stated: "We think this evidence . . . reveals such a state of facts that neither Mr. Smith [the juror] nor anyone else could say that he was not affected in his freedom of action as a juror." 8 9 In short, without explicitly identifying it as such, the Court in Remmer II applied the implied bias doctrine to find a violation of the right to an impartial jury.go Similarly, the next group of cases relied upon by the majority support the viability of the implied bias doctrine and does not establish that 81 Rather than relying upon the traditional "average man" formulation, Justice Marshall argues that bias should be implied as a matter of law "only when the probability of bias is particularly great, and when an evidentiary hearing is particularly unlikely to reveal that bias." 102 S. Ct. at 955 n.14 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The practical difference between the two formulations is uncertain. 94 that an employee of any branch of the federal government should be declared impliedly biased whenever the federal government is a party to a suit. 9 5 These cases, however, only struck down the implied bias doctrine as defined in the narrow sense that bias will be implied from the mere fact of governmental employment in cases involving the federal government. 96 For example, one of these cases held that a defendant convicted of larceny in the District of Columbia could not rely upon Crawford's implied biased doctrine to have a Treasury Department clerk declared biased as a matter of law.
97
The cases did not strike down the implied bias doctrine as it is presently understood. They declared that a defendant has a right to prove "actual bias," 98 specifically defining "actual bias" to include bias arising from suspicious circumstances:
The phrase "actual bias" is used in this opinion as it was in the Wood case. The Wood opinion ... regarded "actual bias" . . . as including not only prejudice in the subjective sense but also such as might be thought implicito to arise "in view of the nature or circumstances of his employment, or of the relation of the particular governmental activity to the matters involved in the prosecution, or otherwise." 99 In holding that a defendant has a right to show "actual bias" as thus defined, Wood, Frazier, and Dennis allow a defendant to show juror bias from the particular circumstances surrounding a juror's relation to a party.
Ioo
Chandler v. Florida 1 0 1 is the final case relied upon by the majority to establish the proposition that the Court had "long held" that a defendant can show a violation of his right to an impartial jury only by proving actual juror bias. The Supreme Court in Chandler again did not use the phrases "implied bias" and "actual bias." If the opinion is read in terms of these concepts, however, it becomes evident that the case does not support the majority's position.
The defendant in Chandler argued that the sixth amendment commands an absolute ban on all broadcast coverage of a defendant's criminal trial unless the defendant consents to the publicity.102 In analyzing this claim, the Supreme Court in Chandler applied the principle of the implied bias doctrine: if broadcasting per se "invariably and uniformly affected the conduct of participants so as to impair fundamental fairness, our task would be simple: prohibition of broadcast coverage of trials would be required."' 0 3 The Court did not find the broadcasting would invariably prejudice jurors, but it did note that defendants remained free to show prejudice from particular circumstances, such as those present in a "Roman circus" or a "Yankee Stadium" atmosphere. 0 4 The Court also expressly disavowed reliance on the jurors' testimony that the broadcasting would not affect their verdict.
1 0 5 Thus, the Court in Chandler applied the principles of the implied bias doctrine rather than holding that the doctrine has no vitality, as the majority in Philh's implied.
C. THE WISDOM OF ABANDONING THE "IMPLIED BIAS" DOCTRINE
The majority in Philh'ps did not articulate a rationale for its position that the opportunity to prove actual bias adequately protects a defendant's right to an impartial jury. Rather, the majority relied upon precedents which do not support its conclusion. I°6 The majority makes hollow the guarantee of the sixth amendment when it conditions a defendant's right to an impartial jury upon the statements of the allegedly biased juror. If the circumstances indicate prejudice, the sixth amendment should require that the juror be deemed prejudiced as a matter of law. A number of opinions support this argument.
In 1807, Chief Justice Marshall rejected the position of the Phillips majority in the trial of Aaron Burr:
The end to be obtained is an impartial jury; to secure this end, a man is prohibited from serving on it whose connection with a party is such as to induce a suspicion of partiality. In Crawford v. United States, the Supreme Court unanimously reaffirmed the applicability of the implied bias doctrine in some situations:
Bias or prejudice is such an elusive condition of the mind that it is most difficult, if not impossible, to always recognize its existence, and it might exist in the mind of one (on account of his relations with one of the parties)
who was quite positive that he had no bias, and said that he was perfectly able to decide the question wholly uninftuenced by anything but the evidence. The law therefore most wisely says that with regard to some of the relations which may exist between the juror and one of the parties, bias is implied, and evidence of its actual existence need not be given. 108 Id. at 51. Chief Justice Marshall prefaced his opinion with the following observation:
The great value of the trial by jury certainly consists in its fairness and impartiality. Those who most prize the institution, prize it because it furnishes a tribunal which may be expected to be uninfluenced by an undue bias of the mind. I have always conceived, and still conceive, an impartial jury as required by the common law, and as secured by the constitution, must be composed of men who will fairly hear the testimony which may be offered to them, and bring their verdict according to that testimony, and according to the law arising on it. This is not to be expected, certainly the law does not expect it, where the jurors, before they hear the testimony, have deliberately formed and delivered an opinion that the person whom they are to try is guilty or innocent of the charge alleged against him. stances which preclude that free, fearless and disinterested capacity in analyzing evidence which is indispensable if jurymen are to deal impartially with an accusation. The judgment that a court must thus exercise in finding "disqualification for bias" of persons who belong to a particular class is a psychological judgment. It is a judgment founded on human experience and not on technical learning .... The reason for disqualifying a whole class on the ground of bias is the law's recognition that if the circumstances of that class in the run of instances are likely to generate bias, consciously or unconsciously, it would be a hopeless endeavor to search out the impact of these circumstances on the mind and judgment of a particular individual.'I'
In Irvin v. Dodd,' 1 2 a decision post-dating four of the five decisions relied upon by the majority in Philh's, the Supreme Court unanimously applied the "implied bias" doctrine sub silento to overturn the conviction of a defendant. The defendant in Irvin was tried in a community highly prejudiced against him because of massive pre-trial publicity. The trial judge personally examined each member of the jury, and each juror indicated that he could be impartial.'
3 Although the defendant made no showing of "actual bias," the Court declared his conviction void. "No doubt each juror was sincere when he said that he would be fair and impartial to petitioner, but the psychological impact requiring such a declaration before one's fellows is often its father." ' 1 4 "[A]ccounting for the frailties of human nature-we can only say that in light of the circumstances here the finding of impartiality does not meet constitutional standards."' 15
Similarly, in Leonard v. United States, 1 6 the Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General that certain individuals should be "automatically disqualified" from serving as jurors.
1 7 The defendant in Leonard received two separate trials for closely related crimes. At the conclusion of the first trial, the jury announced its guilty verdict in the presence of five jurors who were to sit on the jury in the second trial. The Court reversed the second jury's finding that the defendant was guilty, holding that the procedure followed by the district court was plainly erroneous. 118 In Turner v. Louisiana, 1 9 the Court once again overturned a conviction as violative of the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury although the defendant produced no evidence of the jury's actual Thus, the majority in Phillips took issue with the wisdom of many prior opinions of the Supreme Court when it decided to take the unprecedented step of abolishing the implied bias doctrine. Perhaps the judicial safeguards of voir dire and peremptory challenges eliminate the need for the doctrine in most cases, since these safeguards themselves help to ensure the impartiality of ajury.1 22 Phillips, however, shows that these safeguards are far from infallible. During voir dire, Phillips's counsel asked juror Smith about his future employment plans. Smith responded that he planned to obtain overseas employment with the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency.' 23 There was nothing more that Phillips's counsel could have asked at that time regarding Smith's bias. It was impossible for the defendant to elicit the prejudicial circumstances during voir dire, and hence to have reason to exercise a peremptory challenge, since Smith had not yet applied for the position with the District Attorney's office.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision to abandon the implied bias doctrine as a safeguard to the right to an impartial jury was not dictated by precedent. Indeed, prior opinions uniformly argued for the position that the doctrine served a necessary role in protecting sixth amendment rights of defendants. If the Supreme Court had applied the doctrine to the facts in Phillips, it may well have ordered a new trial. Any judgment "founded upon human experience"' 24 would conclude that a juror vigorously applying for a position with the office prosecuting the defendant may well favor the position of his prospective employer. 125 Because of
